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The Law of Cyber Targeting
Michael N. Schmitt1
The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia was predictably short, as Russian 
military might quickly trumped Georgian nationalist enthusiasm. Beyond 
its momentous geopolitical implications, it was the first war in which cyber 
activities loomed large; the conflict marked the public birth of “cyber war”, or 
at least cyber in war.2 
Cyber operations were not a completely new phenomenon. Most notably, they 
had played a significant geopolitical role in the previous year, when “hacktivists” 
around the world directed malicious cyber operations at NATO member 
Estonia following its movement of a Soviet-era statute commemorating the 
Great Patriotic War from central Tallinn to the outskirts of the capital.3 But 
this was not “war” in the traditional sense of two or more states engaged in 
armed hostilities against each other. In the Georgian case, by contrast, the 
cyber activities took place on belligerent territory during an armed conflict 
that involved classic kinetic military operations. Although civilians launched 
most of the attacks, and while they caused no physical damage or injury, there 
is no question that, unlike the events in Estonia the previous year, international 
humanitarian law (IHL, also known as the law of war, law of armed conflict and 
jus in bello) applied.
Cyber activities have become an indelible facet of contemporary warfare, not 
just for cyber-empowered militaries such as those of the United States, but also 
for low-tech forces. Terrorist and insurgent groups benefit from the use of the 
internet to recruit fighters and to finance operations. Social media is exploited 
for purposes that range from passing targeting information to directing the 
deployment of forces (the insurgent “flash mob”). Mobile phones are as much a 
part of the 21st century kit bag as weapons, and email and texting have become 
1 Senior Fellow, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence; Charles H  Stockton 
Professor and Director, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, United States 
Naval War College; Professor of Public International Law, Exeter University; Fellow, Harvard 
Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict  The views expressed are 
those of the author in his personal capacity
2 On the Georgian case, see Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska and Liis Vihul, International Cyber 
Incidents: Legal Considerations (Tallinn: CCD COE Publications, 2010), 66-90
3 Ibid , 14-34
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pervasive means of military communication. The Arab Spring was a watershed 
in this regard, and cyber operations are ongoing in the conflicts in Ukraine 
and Syria. It is quite simply unimaginable that a contemporary conflict would 
not involve some manner of cyber operations, whether as simple as passing 
intelligence information using smart phones or as complicated as bringing down 
the enemy’s integrated air defence system.
In light of the role which cyber operations are playing in contemporary conflicts, 
attention must be paid to the law that governs these activities because, to borrow 
a sports analogy, a team that takes the field without knowing the rules is usually 
going to lose, even if it is the better team. International law, and particularly 
IHL, exerts a powerful influence on tactics, operational planning and strategic 
decision-making in modern warfare. The fight can be won on the battlefield but 
lost in the court of public and international opinion when one side appears to 
have acted outside the law. Given the novelty of cyber operations as a method of 
warfare during an armed conflict, any alleged misuse, even at the tactical level, 
has the potential for strategic consequences. 
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn 
in Estonia, has taken the global lead in addressing this issue. In 2009, it launched 
a three-year project to examine the application of international law, especially 
that governing the use of force, to cyber operations. Over twenty distinguished 
legal scholars and government legal advisors came together to produce the 
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,4 a resource 
currently being expanded in the Centre’s “Tallinn 2.0” project.5
Informed by the Tallinn Manual process, in which the author served as Director, 
this article examines IHL’s core norms – those governing targeting – as applied 
to cyber operations. It does so by following the legal logic applicable to virtually 
every targeting operation, from naval gunfire and air attack to special forces 
operations and space attacks.6 In each such case, those who plan, approve, and 
execute targeting missions have to ask the following questions:
1) What law applies to my operation?
2) May I engage the intended target?
4 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare [hereinafter Tallinn Manual ], 
gen  ed  Michael N  Schmitt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
5 See https://ccdcoe org/research html
6 For a discussion of the law of targeting in general, see Michael N  Schmitt and Eric Widmar, 
‘“On Target”: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting,’ 7(2) Journal of 
National Security Law and Policy (2014)
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3) Is the weapon I want to use legal?
4) What precautions must I take to avoid collateral damage?
5) Do the scope and degree of likely collateral damage prohibit me from
engaging the target?
There is now widespread agreement that international humanitarian law applies 
in its entirety to cyber operations conducted during an armed conflict.7 Thus, 
the questions set out above apply equally to targeting in the cyber context, albeit 
with a degree of interpretive creativity at times. This paper will explain how 
each is resolved with respect to cyber operations. The explanation is designed 
for policy-makers and operators who conduct, rely on, approve or are targeted 
by cyber operations. In the contemporary strategic environment, knowledge of 
the law applicable to cyber warfare is quite simply indispensable.
The Applicable Law (Part I)
The threshold question in every targeting operation is whether the international 
humanitarian law rules even apply. IHL only comes into play when there is a 
war, technically known as an “armed conflict” in legal parlance. There are two 
forms of armed conflict, international and non-international. The former exists 
when hostilities break out between two or more countries,8 whereas the latter 
involves hostilities at a fairly high level between an organised armed group and 
a state or between two or more organised armed groups.9 For example, the use 
of force by Russia clearly created an international armed conflict with Ukraine, 
whereas the hostilities between Assad’s forces and those opposing his regime in 
Syria are non-international in character. Unless one of these two forms of armed 
7 Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 19, U N  Doc  A/68/98, 24 June 
2013, available at: http://undocs org/A/68/98 (regarding international law generally)  This 
is the U S  position  Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U S  State Dept , USCYBERCOM 
Inter-Agency Legal Conference, 18 September 2012, available at: http://www state gov/s/l/
releases/remarks/197924 htm  The International Committee of the Red Cross has endorsed 
the same view  ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary 
Armed Conflicts,’ ICRC Doc  31IC/11/5 1 2, 31 October 2011, 37
8 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces in the Field, art  2, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
art  2, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, art  2, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art  2, Aug  12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287
9 Ibid  (all four conventions), art  3
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conflict exists, IHL is inapplicable and human rights norms and domestic law 
serve as the core constraints on the targeting operation in question.
Whenever there is an armed conflict of either sort, IHL governs those cyber 
operations having a nexus with the conflict.10 To take a simple example, it is no 
less a violation of IHL, and a war crime, to conduct cyber operations intended 
to kill members of the civilian population than it is to bomb or shell them; the 
same law prohibiting direct attacks on civilians is breached.11 How that IHL rule 
applies is discussed below, but it is incontestable that it applies in its entirety to 
conflict-related cyber operations. 
The somewhat more challenging legal question is whether cyber operations 
alone may qualify as armed conflicts to which IHL applies. In other words, if 
there is no armed conflict in the first place, can one begin as a result of cyber 
operations? If so, it becomes lawful to direct cyber and kinetic strikes against 
the armed forces and military objectives of the other state. To address this issue, 
it is necessary to distinguish between international and non-international armed 
conflict.
If there are two or more states involved, the first criterion for an international 
armed conflict is met. The second that hostilities have taken place, is somewhat 
ambiguous.12 Two questions present themselves in this regard. First, can cyber 
exchanges qualify as hostilities? It would seem logical that cyber operations that 
are qualitatively “attacks”, as the term is used in IHL, qualify as hostilities in the 
same way as kinetic attacks; they are operations causing damage or injury. After 
all, there is no normative or practical logic for distinguishing between a cyber 
operation that damages objects or injures people and a kinetic operation with 
precisely the same effects. 
10 On the topic generally, see Michael N  Schmitt, ‘Classification of Cyber Conflict’ 89 International 
Law Studies 233 (2013)
11 For each of the IHL norms, this article will cite: 1) the relevant treaty provision, although 
the US is not a party to that most often cited,  Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions; 2) the ICRC’s Customary IHL study rule indicating the norm is customary in 
nature, i e , binding on all states; 3) the relevant paragraph from the U.S. Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of Naval Operations; and 4) the applicable Tallinn Manual rule reflecting its application 
in the cyber context  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol I], June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art  51(2); Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck, eds  (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), r  1; Department of the Navy and Department of Homeland Security, 
The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations [hereinafter Commander’s Handbook], 
NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800 7A, 2007, para  8 3; Tallinn Manual, r  32
12 Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, 82
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However, whether cyber operations not qualifying as an attack under IHL 
may initiate an armed conflict remains unsettled. For instance, would cyber 
operations that result in a major loss of confidence in the stock market, a 
consequence far more serious than minor property damage or injury, qualify? 
Perhaps, as noted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “[i]t 
would appear that the answer to these questions will probably be determined in 
a definite manner only through future State practice.”13
Second, is there any severity requirement for an attack, whether kinetic or cyber, 
that starts an international armed conflict? The quantitative threshold is unclear 
in law. It is sometimes argued that, for instance, minor exchanges of fire between 
the forces of two states do not rise to the level of an armed conflict. However, 
a better view is that which has been asserted by the ICRC for many years: “It 
makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, 
or how numerous are the participating forces.”14 This approach is, as lawyers say, 
more consistent with the “object and purpose” of IHL, since a state will want its 
civilians and civilian objects protected, and at the same time be able to use lethal 
force against the other side if hostilities break out. 
Accordingly, an international armed conflict could begin based solely on cyber 
exchanges if two or more states were involved and the nature of the operations 
qualified them as attacks. To cite a well-known example, assuming that states 
conducted the 2010 Stuxnet operation, the damage arguably meant that Iran and 
those states were involved an international armed conflict, at least for the period 
during which the damaging acts were underway.15 
Cyber exchanges alone are far less likely to meet the two criteria for non-
international armed conflict.16 First, the state must be facing an “organised 
armed group”. Although the legal preconditions for qualification as such are 
rather complicated, in the cyber context the pressing question is whether they 
are met by a group organised entirely online. Organised armed groups have to in 
some way be “commanded” and some degree of structure must exist that allows 
13 International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra 
note 7, 37
14 Jean Pictet (ed ), Commentary: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces the Field (Geneva: ICRC, 1952), 20
15 But see discussion in Cordula Droege, ‘Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International 
Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians,’ 94, no  886 International Review of the Red 
Cross (2012) 548
16 Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No  IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 70  
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their members to operate as a unit.17 It is also often suggested that “organisation” 
requires there to be a means to enforce IHL among the group.18 It is difficult 
to see how a virtual group in which members may not even know each other’s 
names or physical location could meet this condition.
Additionally, the group in question must be armed. The logic underlying the 
discussion of international armed conflict would appear useful by analogy. 
“Armed” can be interpreted as a requirement for “hostilities”, which are acts 
that qualify as “attacks”. In the organised armed group context, therefore, an 
organised armed group is one that conducts kinetic or cyber attacks. Thus, a 
group that merely conducted non-destructive denial of service operations, 
for example, would not qualify. This is one reason why the operations against 
Estonia did not rise to the level of a non-international armed conflict. Those 
involved were acting in concert, but were not organised into a particular armed 
group or groups.
Second, and unlike international armed conflict, the violence associated with 
a non-international armed conflict must be protracted and must reach a high 
level of severity. It does not include “situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts 
of a similar nature.”19 Even cyber operations causing death or destruction will 
sometimes not suffice. Neither would a single dramatic cyber operation such 
as a cyber terrorist attack qualify, even if causing harm far above this level, 
because it would not be protracted. In the simplest terms, the cyber conflict 
must start looking like a war. Turning again to the Estonian case, the hacktivist 
operations did not rise to this level because, despite widespread disruption of 
societal functions, there was no physical damage or injury. 
Non-state actor cyber operations meeting these demanding criteria are currently 
unlikely. A more probable scenario is one in which cyber operations accompany 
kinetic ones and are governed by IHL on that basis. Therefore, when non-state 
17 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No  IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 89 (Int’l Crim  Trib  for the former 
Yugoslavia Nov  30, 2005)
18 See, e g , Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds ), Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [hereinafter Additional 
Protocols Commentary] (ICRC, 1988), para  4463; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts [hereinafter Additional Protocol II], June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art  1(1)
19 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  1(2) (the provision is generally characterised as 
reflecting customary law regarding qualification as a non-international armed conflict)  See 
also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, art  
8 2(d)
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actor cyber operations occur in isolation from kinetic attacks, they will typically 
be governed by the domestic law of states exercising jurisdiction over the person 
and the particular subject matter, as well as human rights law, but not by the IHL 
norms described below.
The Applicable Law (Part II)
Once it is determined that an armed conflict to which IHL applies is underway, 
the next step is to determine whether the law of targeting applies to the cyber 
operation in question.20 Doing so is more difficult than might appear at first 
glance. Indeed, the Tallinn Manual experts struggled with the subject for three 
years without reaching full consensus.
Any discussion of targeting begins with the principle of distinction, which is 
codified in Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions:
“The Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly direct their operations only against military objectives.21”
Although the United States is not a party to that instrument, it recognises Article 
48 as reflective of customary international law,22 which binds all states.23 Indeed, 
the principle is arguably the most important in IHL, one that the International 
Court of Justice has labelled as one of the two “cardinal” principles of IHL.24
In international law circles, a major debate with particular resonance in the 
cyber context is whether the principle of distinction rules out all operations 
against objects and persons that do not qualify as military objectives, especially 
20 On the subject generally, see Michael N  Schmitt, ‘“Attack” as a Term of Art in International 
Law: The Cyber Operations Context,’ in Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis and Katharina 
Ziolkowski (eds ), Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (NATO CCD COE 
Publications, 2012) 283  
21 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  48  See also Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
supra note 11, rr  1 and 7; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  31
22 Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  8 2;
23 Customary international law is a form of law unique to international law  It “crystallises” into 
a norm binding on all states once widespread state practice that is engaged in out of a sense of 
legal obligation (opinio juris) exists  Although unwritten, it is of equal legal force as treaty law  
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat  1055, 33 UNTS 993, art  
38
24 Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I C J 226, 78 ( July 8)  
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civilians and civilian objects. Textually, the article certainly appears to say as 
much, but such a conclusion would be both counter-intuitive and ahistorical. 
After all, military operations have been directed against civilian populations for 
centuries.
A closer look into Additional Protocol I reveals a series of prohibitions and 
restrictions on “attack” that operationalise the principle: attacks against civilians 
and civilian objects are prohibited, indiscriminate attacks are forbidden, parties 
to a conflict must take precautions to minimise civilian harm when planning 
and conducting attacks, a defender must take precautions to protect the civilian 
population against the effects of attacks, and so forth.25 Helpfully, “attacks” 
is defined in the Protocol as “acts of violence against the enemy, whether in 
offence or defence.”26 The characterisation of an attack as a violent act is repeated 
throughout the treaty27 and in ICRC and other commentaries thereon.28
It would seem, however, that the Protocol is inartfully worded. Violent acts are of 
less concern in IHL than violent consequences. This has been obvious for decades, 
the paradigmatic examples being the prohibitions on chemical, biological and 
radiological attacks, which are not violent in the sense of releasing kinetic 
force but have violent consequences, notably death. By the same logic, a cyber 
operation causing injury to persons or damage to objects is an attack subject to 
all the relevant IHL rules on attacks.29
But controversy surrounds the issue of whether the notion of attacks should 
be interpreted more broadly. A cyber operation targeting civilian cyber 
infrastructure (“communications, storage, and computing resources upon 
which information systems operate”30) without physical effects could be far 
more detrimental than one causing limited damage. Consider an attack during 
an armed conflict on the enemy’s banking, taxation, government pensions, or 
airline reservations systems. Critics of a restrictive interpretation argue that it 
seems incongruent to prohibit only the latter.
Two methods have surfaced that take account of this reality without having 
to either successfully negotiate new treaty terms (an unlikely eventuality) 
25 Additional Protocol I, arts  51(2), 52(1), 57, 58; emphasis added
26 Ibid , art  49 
27 See, e g , ibid , arts  35, 51(1), 51(2), 55, 56(1)
28 Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 18, para  1875; Michael Bothe et al , New Rules for 
Victims of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) 289
29 Tallinn Manual, rule 30  
30 Ibid , 258
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or interpret the current law in a fashion that renders it unrecognisable. First, 
there are those who would interpret data as an object, such that an operation 
that manipulated, altered, or deleted civilian data would be prohibited.31 The 
conceptual problem is that the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I 
describes an object as something “tangible”,32 and data certainly is not that. 
Goal-oriented legal academics have proposed creative interpretation as a means 
of hurdling this particular obstacle, but fail to offer a viable practical alternative. 
If data is treated as an object, any operation that manipulates civilian data would 
qualify as “damage” (alteration of data) or “destruction” (deletion of data) of 
a “civilian object” and would thus be unlawful. As an example, deletion of 
a civilian’s forum or blog post would be a violation of IHL, as would non-
destructive psychological cyber operations directed at the civilian population. 
Moreover, such an interpretation would dramatically affect application of 
the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack, 
both of which extend further protection to civilian objects.33 International 
humanitarian law is a careful balancing of humanitarian concerns with military 
necessity; simply styling data as an object would throw this balance out of kilter 
by barring operations that today are considered lawful in both their cyber and 
traditional guises. 
The second approach, and the one adopted by a majority of the experts involved 
in the Tallinn Manual project, is to include “loss of functionality” in the concept 
of damage.34 By this, a cyber operation that affects the functionality of cyber 
infrastructure (from a laptop computer to a huge server farm or SCADA system) 
thus necessitating repair, qualifies as an attack even if no physical damage results. 
This approach makes sense, for it is fair to describe an item as damaged when 
it does not work; it is broken, even though it may not be physically damaged. 
Among the experts taking this position, there were various shades of opinion. 
Some were of the view that needing to reload the operating system satisfied the 
damage criterion. Others went so far as to say that cyber operations affecting 
data stored on the computer’s drives would suffice, although this was a minority 
view. 
The implications of the majority positions set out above are significant. Unless 
31 Tallinn Manual, 126
32 Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 18, paras  2007-08
33 See discussion of this issue in Michael N  Schmitt, ‘The Notion of “Objects” during Cyber 
Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive Precision,’ 48 Israel Law Review (forthcoming 
2015)  
34 Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, 108-09
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a cyber operation has consequences that at least affect the functionality of an 
object, it does not qualify as an attack and is therefore not prohibited. During an 
armed conflict, it is generally legal to conduct cyber operations directed against 
civilians and civilian objects, so long as they are not harmed or injured. To 
illustrate, it would be lawful to conduct denial of service attacks that blocked 
civilian e-services such as tax collection or the payment of pension benefits, but 
did not harm or affect the functionality of the associated cyber infrastructure, at 
least until the economic consequences became so severe that they began to have 
physical effects, such as starvation or illness. Similarly, by the majority approach, 
it is lawful to alter or destroy data so long as no consequences amounting to 
injury, physical damage or loss of functionality are manifest; examples could 
include government archives, birth or citizenship records, business records and 
market returns. Although such operations would raise serious moral, political, 
and social issues, they nevertheless appear lawful today.
The Target
Assuming that a cyber operation occurs during an armed conflict and qualifies 
as an attack as described above, the next hurdle is determining whether the 
target is a lawful one. Cyber operations most frequently implicate the prohibition 
on attacking civilian objects. In IHL, civilian objects are defined negatively as 
“all objects which are not military objectives.”35 Military objectives are “objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”36 
The equipment and facilities of the armed forces are military objectives by nature; 
a command-and-control facility and cyber infrastructure developed for specific 
military tasks both qualify, for example, on this basis. A particular location can 
also be a military objective, as when cyber means are used to open a dam’s gates 
to flood an area and deny its use to the enemy. Aside from military equipment, 
the most likely military objective in the cyber context is an object that qualifies 
by the “use” criterion; that is, one that was used or is still being used for civilian 
purposes, but is now being employed, at least in part, for military ends. It should 
35 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  52(1)  See also Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
supra note 11, r  9; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  8 3; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  
38
36 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  52(1)  See also Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
supra note 11, r  8; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  8 2; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  
38
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be cautioned that a rule of reason holds when applying this criterion to cyber 
activities. For instance, the mere fact that the military sends email over the 
internet does not render the entire internet a lawful target. Finally, a civilian 
object can become a military objective through purpose, which refers to the 
intended future use of an object. For example, if there is reliable intelligence that 
a civilian server farm will soon begin to store military data, the server farm is a 
military objective that may be attacked even before data storage begins.
These definitions do not present any particular problems in the cyber setting. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the pervasive use of civilian cyber 
infrastructure for military purposes has transformed much of it into valid military 
objectives. When an object is used for both civilian and military purposes, 
it is labelled “dual-use”. In targeting terms, this is so whether something is 
exclusively used for military purposes, is shared by civilian and military users, or 
is only used to a limited degree by the military, it qualifies as a targetable military 
objective. The civilian aspects of the target are relevant to the requirements for 
proportionality and precautions in attack requirements as described below, but 
civilian use does not diminish its qualification as a military objective.
To take a simple example, many air traffic control and airspace management 
systems serve both civilian and military aircraft. When this is the case, they are 
military objectives irrespective of the extent of civilian reliance on them. The 
communications lines to which the systems are connected are also dual-use, and 
so they too qualify as military objectives, as do any routers involved and any 
servers on which their data is stored. The harsh reality of 21st century military 
cyber activity is that the heavy reliance on civilian products and infrastructure 
dramatically expands the universe of targetable objects, including systems on 
which important civilian functions rely.
The introduction of cyber capabilities into contemporary combat has also 
exacerbated a long-standing debate over the notion of military objectives. 
All states and legal commentators agree that the term encompasses so-called 
“war-fighting” and “war-supporting” objects. The former are those used 
to conduct military operations, whereas the latter include objects on which 
military operations rely in some relatively direct sense, such as factories that 
make munitions, weapons or equipment (including computer equipment) used 
by the military, even when they also produce civilian products. They may not 
necessarily be attacked, because of the operation of the rule of proportionality 
and the requirement to take precautions in attack, but they unquestionably 
qualify as military objectives. What is especially significant with regard to 
the war-supporting category in the cyber context is the extent to which the 
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dependency of the armed forces on civilian products and infrastructure not 
only makes the objects in question legally targetable, but also the facilities that 
produce them. 
However, a third category, “war-sustaining” objects, has generated widespread 
controversy. The US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 
the most current US manual addressing international humanitarian law, labels 
enemy “war-sustaining” objects as military objectives susceptible to lawful 
attack.37 An annotated version of the Handbook offers the example of cotton 
during the Civil War.38 But for the export of cotton, the Confederate States 
would have been unable to finance their war effort and cotton exports sustained 
the war. Therefore, according to this approach, that industry was rendered 
lawfully targetable. The contemporary analogue would be those aspects of an 
economy or governmental financial system upon which the enemy relies in order 
to fund participation in the conflict. An obvious example are the oil industries 
of countries that depend heavily on oil exports for funding; although the United 
States has never developed the concept with any granularity, other examples 
might also include the tax systems, financial systems, transport network, and 
the like.
The significance of this approach cannot be overstated when applied to the 
cyber environment. Many war sustaining targets cannot be struck kinetically 
in a fashion that would generate the same effects as cyber attacks. Consider the 
banking system. While kinetic attacks against banks would be highly disruptive, 
given the limitations of kinetic weaponry and the number of potential targets 
falling into this category, creating strategic effects capable of undermining the 
sustainability of the war effort is unlikely. However, cyber attacks that would, 
for instance, render the cyber infrastructure upon which the banking system 
relies dysfunctional could bring the entire system down. Indeed, the operations 
need not even rise to the level of an attack as described above. Cyber operations 
that either deleted funds from accounts or began to change account balances 
would trigger, for example a collapse of confidence in the banking system that 
would cause transactions to grind to a halt. While the war-sustaining debate 
previously loomed large, the ability of cyber operations to make war-sustaining 
attacks possible and effective at the operational and strategic level will probably 
reinvigorate the debate. This is especially so in light of the fact that very few 
states have openly embraced the US approach, thereby rendering the world’s 
37 Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  8 2
38 A R  Thomas and James C  Duncan (eds ), Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on 
the Law of Naval Operations (Naval War College Press, 1999), 403
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most cyber empowered military as an outlier on the matter. 
In addition to objects, “persons” may qualify as lawful targets. It is, of course, 
possible to attack people by cyber means, for instance, by starting fires in facilities 
in which they are located, interfering with air traffic control relied upon by the 
aircraft transporting them, causing train collisions, and so forth. Additionally, 
individuals involved in cyber operations may be targeted kinetically once they 
have been identified and located. The issues are which people are targetable as a 
matter of law, and when may they be targeted.
Obviously, members of the armed forces who conduct cyber operations 
are always targetable (unless hors de combat); they are combatants.39 The rules 
regarding when civilians may be targeted are far more complex. To address this, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross sponsored a five-year research 
study between 2003 and 2008 involving a group of 40 international experts.40 
The experts agreed that members of an organised armed group, as defined 
above, are targetable while they are members of the group.41 They disagreed, 
however, over precisely which members of the group were targetable. The ICRC 
was of the position that only those with a “continuous combat function” could 
be attacked. Such functions encompass roles in the group that involve activities 
likely to adversely affect the enemy.42 Some individual participants in the project 
countered that all members of a group formed to conduct hostilities (or the 
members of the armed wing of a group that includes other functions, such as 
Hamas) could be attacked, a position that appears to be favoured by the United 
States, Israel and other countries with significant combat experience.43
Applied to cyber, the approaches taken to direct participation lead in different 
directions. Take an organised armed group that conducts kinetic hostilities, but 
also has “cyber operators”. All those who conduct cyber operations against the 
39 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  50(1) and 51(2); Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, supra note 11, r  1; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  8 2 1; Tallinn Manual, supra 
note 4, r  34
40 Nils Melzer (ed ), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance] (ICRC, 2009)
41 Ibid , 71  The author served as one of the experts  On the issue, see Kenneth Watkin, 
‘Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Interpretive Guidance”’  42 New York Journal of International Law and Politics 641 
(2010)
42 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 71
43 See discussion in Michael N  Schmitt, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis,’ 1(5) Harvard National Security Journal 21-24 
(2010)
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enemy or who defend against the enemy’s operations have a continuous combat 
function and therefore would be targetable by either approach. Other members 
may have cyber-related duties, such as maintaining propaganda websites or 
recruiting members. By the ICRC approach, they do not have a continuous 
combat function and therefore would not be targetable unless they assume such 
a function within the group. By the alternative approach, they could be attacked 
at any time, based on their membership of the group.
Individuals unaffiliated with an organised armed group, or, in the ICRC 
approach, who do not have a continuous combat function in such a group, are 
only targetable “for such time” as they “take a direct part in hostilities”.44 An act 
is direct participation when it meets three criteria.45 First, it must adversely affect 
the military operations or military capability of one of the parties to the conflict, 
or injure or damage persons or objects protected by IHL, such as civilians and 
civilian objects.46 It is important to understand that this does not require that the 
activity qualify as an attack. As an example, gathering and disseminating tactical 
and operational level intelligence by cyber means suffices, as does probing 
enemy systems in order to identify vulnerabilities. 
Second, the qualifying activity must directly cause the harm or be an integral 
component of the operation that does so.47 There has been some controversy 
over this requirement with respect to the production of improvised explosive 
devices and serving as a voluntary human shield. Although both activities are 
sometimes characterised as indirect, the better position is that causal nexus 
between such activities and harm to the enemy is sufficiently direct.48 The cyber 
analogue would be the development of software specific to an attack on the 
enemy system or allowing cyber operations to be launched from one’s home or 
business by others. One thing that all parties agree on is that factory workers 
do not qualify as direct participants in hostilities. This being so, individuals 
involved in the production of cyber infrastructure and equipment, or its general 
(as distinct from operational) maintenance are not targetable direct participants, 
44 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  51(3); Additional Protocol II, supra note 18, art  13(3); 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r  6; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, 
para  8 2 2; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  35
45 See generally Michael N  Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements,’ 42 New York Journal of International Law and Politics 698 (2010)
46 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 47
47 Ibid , 51
48 See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 53-54, 56-57; Michael N  Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements,’ 42 New York Journal of International Law 
and Politics 719, 732-34 (2010)
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although the facilities in which they operate will qualify as military targets by 
virtue of their use.
The third requirement is that there be a nexus between the activity and the 
conflict.49 In other words, the activity must be related to the on-going conflict 
as distinct from being an act of criminality or mere maliciousness. Although 
sometimes difficult to discern, the experts are in accord on this criterion.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the direct participation rules in the 
cyber context. The Georgia-Russia armed conflict, as well as subsequent ones, 
demonstrate that the civilian population is highly likely to become involved in 
the cyber aspects of the conflict. For instance, in the Georgia case, a website 
(“StopGeorgia.ru”) containing cyber targets and downloadable malware 
necessary to conduct cyber operations appeared online soon after the launch of 
kinetic operations. 50 The site proved effective in enabling cyber operations by 
civilians against Georgian military and civilian cyber targets. As this example 
illustrates, it is far easier to “cyber arm” a civilian population than to do so 
with traditional weaponry. Additionally, many individuals have the know-how 
to conduct harmful cyber operations; all they require is connectivity to begin 
participating in the hostilities themselves and share their knowledge with other 
potential direct participants. 
To compound matters, the scope of activities constituting the direct participation 
in hostilities is broad. Conducting a simple denial-of-service operation, building 
a botnet for use against the enemy, or texting to transmit visual sighting of enemy 
forces would all qualify as direct participation that justifies lethally attacking the 
person involved. As should be apparent, the direct participation rule means the 
pool of targetable individuals could be extremely large in future conflicts, far 
more than is the case in classic conflict. 
That said, one possible obstacle to far-reaching application of the rule is 
that a direct participant is only targetable “for such time” as he or she is so 
participating.51 The ICRC has suggested that this period includes measures 
preparatory to a specific act of direct participation, as well as deployment to 
and return from the activity concerned.52 This is a rather impractical standard 
in the cyber context. Except for close-access operations (those involving in-
49 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 58
50 Tikk, Kaska and Vihul, supra note 2, 73
51 See generally Bill Boothby, ‘“And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct 
Participation in Hostilities,’ 42 New York Journal of International Law and Politics 741 (2010)
52 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 69-73
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person manipulation of cyber infrastructure), there is usually no deployment to 
and from a cyber operation; they are conducted remotely. Thus, by the ICRC 
approach, the direct participant would have to be caught in the act, a standard 
that dramatically narrows the window of targetability. Further rendering 
this position impracticable is the fact that cyber operations can be very brief, 
sometimes so brief that an attacker cannot be identified to the level of reasonable 
confidence before the operation is over. Therefore, the better approach is to 
characterise an individual who engages in multiple cyber operations that are part 
of an on-going cyber campaign as a direct participant targetable throughout the 
period of activity. Once the individual definitively withdraws from participation, 
he or she regains their protection from attack, and not before.53 
The Weapon 
While certain uses of cyber weapons (malware) violate IHL, such as “attacking” 
civilians, cyber weapons may also be unlawful per se; that is, irrespective of 
actual use. The prohibition most relevant in this regard is that on indiscriminate 
means (weapons).54 Weapons are prohibited when they 1) cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective or 2) generate uncontrollable effects. In both 
cases, the weapons are indiscriminate in the sense that they are incapable of 
distinguishing between combatants and civilians or civilian objects and military 
objectives. The paradigmatic example of the former is the V2 rocket used during 
World War II, which had a guidance system that was so rudimentary that it could 
not be reliably aimed at individual military objectives. Biological contagions 
illustrate the latter, because an attacker employing them cannot control their 
spread from human to human. 
Cyber weapons may at times run afoul of these prohibitions. For example, 
consider malware intended for use against military cyber infrastructure linked to 
civilian networks. If the malware is designed to spread randomly throughout the 
system into which it is introduced, it is indiscriminate by nature and prohibited 
per se. Similarly, malware developed for placement on a website that is open to 
civilians and combatants alike would qualify as indiscriminate irrespective of 
any desire on the part of its user to affect only military systems. Perhaps the 
53 Other aspects of international law may also limit the targetability of an individual  For 
instance, the law of neutrality will generally bar conducting operations against a person located 
on neutral territory  Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, rr  91-94
54 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  51(4)(b) and (c); Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, supra note 11, r  71;Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  9 1 2; Tallinn Manual, supra 
note 4, rule 43
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most well-known indiscriminate cyber weapon is the malicious but seemingly 
innocuous email attachment sent to a combatant’s private email account. Since 
the attacker has no control over to whom it might be forwarded, the email, 
depending on its apparent nature (e.g., a humorous email likely to be forwarded), 
would be indiscriminate. 
It must be cautioned that the restrictions on indiscriminate weapons only apply 
when the cyber weapon in question is used to conduct attacks. They do not bear 
on malware that does not cause injury, damage or loss of system functionality. 
For instance, an email attachment that when opened simply enables future 
access by the sender would not be unlawful under IHL even though the sender 
might not be able to control its further spread into civilian systems.
Because of this, as well as the fact that advanced cyber weapons likely to be 
used by states in armed conflict are by nature designed to exploit particular 
vulnerabilities in specific systems, few cyber weapons violate the prohibition 
on indiscriminate weapons. Cyber weapons can be employed against closed 
military systems in which the risk of bleed-over into civilian networks is low. 
Of course, there is always some risk of unintentional or unanticipated migration 
into civilian systems, as illustrated by the Stuxnet malware that, contrary to 
the intent of its designers, escaped the nuclear enrichment plant. Yet, the risk 
of malfunction or unanticipated effects is a pervasive feature of weaponry writ 
large; only when the weapon is incapable of being aimed or controlled is it 
prohibited as indiscriminate.
Precautions to Avoid Civilian Harm
Even when employing a lawful cyber weapon against a lawful target, an attacker 
must take “constant care” to “spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
objects.”55 To achieve this, the law specifies a number of precautionary measures. 
The attacker must do everything feasible to verify that the target is not protected 
by IHL;56 select the weapon, tactic, and target that will minimise civilian harm 
without forfeiting military advantage;57 cancel or suspend an attack when reason 
55 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  57(1); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra 
note 11, r  15; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  8 1; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  52
56 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  57(2)(a)(i); Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
supra note 11, r  16; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  53
57 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  57(2)(a)(ii) and 57(3); Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r  17 and 21; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, rr  54 and 56
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to believe that the attack may be unlawful comes to light;58 and warn the civilian 
population of any attack that may affect them, unless doing so would not be 
feasible in the circumstances.59
Cyber capabilities raise a number of issues in this regard. They can, for example, 
be used to gather target information. If doing so would improve knowledge as 
to the target’s legal status (and it is militarily feasible in the circumstances given 
such factors as attack timing and competing demands for the cyber asset), the 
attacker must undertake the effort. Cyber operations may also provide a means 
of issuing warnings to the civilian population of both cyber and kinetic attack. 
For instance, general warnings of attack could be transmitted through civilian 
systems networked to military cyber infrastructure urging measures to be taken 
to safeguard them from the effects of attack on the military objectives.
However, the most significant impact of the precautions in attack rules lies in 
the requirement to consider alternative weapons, tactics and targets in order to 
minimise civilian incidental harm. To illustrate, it may be possible to neutralise 
an integrated air defence system by cyber means instead of conducting kinetic 
attacks against its assorted components. Since cyber operations would in most 
cases be less likely to cause collateral damage, they would be required by law in 
lieu of kinetic alternatives, if feasible and militarily sensible. Cyber operations 
may also open the possibility of striking different targets in order to achieve a 
desired effect. As an example, in order to disrupt enemy operations, it may be 
possible to use cyber assets against communications infrastructure serving a 
command-and-control facility located near civilians, rather than attacking the 
facility itself, and achieve precisely the desired effect. Indeed, it could prove 
useful to preserve the facility in order to subsequently exploit it by using cyber 
means to transmit false instructions and other information to the enemy forces.
It must be emphasised that the precautions in attack rule regarding selection of 
weapons, tactics and targets is obligatory. If cyber means are reasonably available, 
their use makes military sense in the circumstances, and their employment 
would not diminish the likelihood of operational success, the attacking force 
must use them. Failure to do so will violate the law. It is accordingly prudent for 
those who plan, approve and execute military operations to have ready access to 
cyber expertise that apprise them of cyber options. Ignorance is not an excuse 
58 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  57(2)(b); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra 
note 11, r  19; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  57
59 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  57(2)(c); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra 
note 11, r  20; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r  58
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for failure to comply with the rule in situations where the individual concerned 
should have known that a cyber operation was feasible in the circumstances and 
would likely have resulted in less collateral damage.
Collateral Damage
Once the attacker has surveyed the range of possible operations to achieve 
the desired effects and selected that viable alternative which best minimises 
collateral damage, the operation is assessed against the rule of proportionality. 
This rule provides that “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated,” is prohibited.60 
Two mistakes have proven common when applying the rule of proportionality. 
First, the rule is often mischaracterised as a balancing test in which military 
advantage and collateral damage are somehow accorded values that presumably 
can be compared. Not only is it difficult to imagine how this could be done 
in practice, but portraying proportionality as a balancing test runs counter to 
the plain text of the rule, which only precludes an attack when the collateral 
damage is “excessive”. Excessive refers to a “significant imbalance”,61 one in 
which it is reasonably clear that causing the expected degree of collateral damage 
is not justified by the military advantage the attacker hopes to attain. Since cyber 
operations can generate effects that are not typically present in warfare, and 
therefore somewhat unfamiliar, fidelity to the excessive standard is essential as 
it affords the attacker the correct degree of discretion.
Second, the rule is unfortunately often applied post factum. However, as is 
clear from its text, the proportionality assessment is made ex ante. Expected 
collateral damage is assessed against the anticipated military advantage. The 
actual collateral damage caused and the military advantage that actually 
results are relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the attacker’s pre-attack 
proportionality assessment, but are not dispositive as to whether the attacker 
has satisfied the rule of proportionality. This is again an important point in the 
cyber context because of the widespread linkage of civilian and military systems 
60 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art  57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b); Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r  14; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para  8 3 1; Tallinn 
Manual, supra note 4, r  51
61 Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 96
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and the difficulty an attacker may face in evaluating potential effects at the time 
the cyber mission is planned, approved or executed. 
With respect to the substantive aspects of proportionality, cyber operations 
can serve to minimise collateral damage and therefore make compliance with 
the rule more likely. The networked nature of cyber infrastructure, however, 
heightens the risk of indirect effects on civilian systems. This is particularly true 
in light of the wide-ranging reliance of the military on dual use cyber systems. 
To the extent to which indirect effects are foreseeable, they must be considered 
when making proportionality calculations. That said, the proportionality rule, 
like the prohibition on weapons generating uncontrollable effects, only requires 
the consideration of “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians” and “damage to 
civilian objects”. Other indirect effects of a cyber operation on civilians, civilian 
objects and other persons and objects protected by IHL are not factored into 
the equation.
Conclusion
Cyber operations appeared on the battlefield in a dangerous interpretive void. As 
so often happens, technology has outpaced the law, or at least full understanding 
of how extant law governs emerging cyber capabilities. This state of affairs is 
always strategically perilous. On the one hand, options that are in fact lawful 
are sometimes needlessly taken off the table out of misguided concern as to 
their legality. On the other, unlawful options are at times seriously considered, 
thereby risking public and international condemnation should they be selected.
The normative fog of cyber war is beginning to clear, albeit slowly. This 
article has surveyed those aspects of international humanitarian law relevant 
to targeting, the activity during an armed conflict that poses the greatest risk 
to the defender and the civilian population. But targeting equally poses the 
greatest risk to the attacker, not only from an operational perspective, but also 
in terms of mission accomplishment. Characterisation of a cyber operation as 
unlawful can quickly wipe away any gains which the operation has attained. 
It is accordingly essential that those occupying roles have responsibility for 
overseeing and executing cyber operations develop a degree of understanding as 
to their normative boundaries. 
